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 Chapter 3 
 Migration and Immigrants in Europe: 
A Historical and Demographic Perspective 
 Christof  Van  Mol and  Helga  de  Valk 
 Introduction 
 This chapter outlines the general developments of migration within and towards 
Europe as well as patterns of settlement of migrants since the 1950s. We take as our 
starting point the bilateral labour migration agreements signed by several European 
countries in the 1950s and 1960s. Three main periods can be distinguished from this 
point onwards. The fi rst, up to the oil crisis in 1973–1974, was characterized by 
steady economic growth and development and deployment of guest worker schemes, 
(return) migration from former colonies to motherlands, and refugee migration, 
mainly dominated by movements from East to West. The second period started with 
the oil crisis and ended with the fall of the Iron Curtain in the late 1980s. During this 
time North-Western European governments increasingly restricted migration, and 
migrants’ main route of entrance became family reunifi cation and family formation. 
Furthermore, asylum applications increased. By the end of this period, migration 
fl ows had started to divert towards former emigration countries in Southern Europe. 
The third period is from the fall of the Iron Curtain until today, with increasing 
European Union (EU) infl uence and control of migration from third countries into 
the EU and encouragement of intra-European mobility. 
 The historical overview presented here stems from a comprehensive literature 
study, complemented by an analysis of available statistical data for trends in the last 
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decade. It should be noted, however, that statistical data on migration and mobility 
in Europe is mostly incomplete, as they are based mainly on reports and registra-
tions of the individuals concerned. Besides, data on immigration and emigration are 
not always fully available and are not consistently measured across countries and 
time (see, e.g., EMN  2013 ). This means that the quality of migration data is often 
limited (Abel  2010 ; Kupiszewska and Nowok  2008 ; Nowok et al.  2006 ; Poulain 
et al.  2006 ). Several initiatives and projects have been launched to overcome these 
problems and promote comparable defi nitions, statistics, and estimations of missing 
data (Raymer et al.  2011 ). Most of the EU’s current 28 member countries produce 
annual statistics on immigration and emigration. However, the information and 
level of detail is not yet comparable across countries (for an overview of databanks 
and limitations, see Raymer et al.  2011 ). The fi nal section of this chapter presents 
fi gures on migration and migrants relying mainly on data from three research proj-
ects which aimed to create and improve harmonized and consistent migration data 
(Abel and Sander  2014 ; Raymer et al.  2011 , see  www.nidi.nl for more information 
on the MIMOSA and IMEM projects). The conclusion summarizes the main pat-
terns and discusses some implications of our fi ndings. 
 Three Periods of Migration in Europe 
 From the 1950s to 1974: Guest Worker Schemes 
and Decolonization 
 In the period after the Second World War, North-Western Europe was economically 
booming. Industrial production, for example, increased by 30 % between 1953 and 
1958 (Dietz and Kaczmarczyk  2008 ). Native workers in this region became increas-
ingly educated, and growing possibilities for social mobility enabled many of them 
to move up to white-collar work (Boyle et al.  1998 ). Local workers could not fi ll the 
vacancies, as labour reservoirs were limited. Furthermore, the local native popula-
tion was no longer willing to take up unhealthy and poorly paid jobs in agriculture, 
cleaning, construction, and mining. As a result, North-Western European govern-
ments started to recruit labour in peripheral countries. The main destination coun-
tries were Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, and 
Switzerland. The recruited foreign workers were expected to return home after 
completing a stint of labour. They therefore tended to be granted few rights and little 
or no access to welfare support (Boyle et al.  1998 ). At the end of this period, most 
migrants in North-Western Europe originated from Algeria, Greece, Italy, Morocco, 
Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. 
 Initially, geographical proximity played an important role in the development of 
specifi c migration fl ows. For example, Sweden recruited labour from Finland, the UK 
from Ireland, and Switzerland from Italy. A migration system emerged whereby 
peripheral—especially Southern European—countries supplied workers to 
 North- Western European countries. Migration fl ows were strongly guided by differ-
ences in economic development between regions characterized by pre-industrial 
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agrarian economies and those with highly industrialized economies (Bade  2003 ; 
Barou  2006 ), both internationally and nationally (e.g., with unskilled workers moving 
from Southern Italy towards the industrial centres in Northern Italy). Within the ori-
gin countries, most migrant workers were from poor agricultural regions where there 
was insuffi cient work, such as Northern Portugal, Western Spain, Southern Italy, and 
Northern Greece (Bade  2003 ). However, European governments gradually enlarged 
their zones of recruitment to countries outside Europe. One of the main reasons was 
the Cold War division of Europe which severely restricted East- West labour mobility. 
In West Germany, for example, there was a signifi cant infl ow of workers from Greece, 
Italy, and Spain, as well as from East Germany. The construction of the Berlin Wall in 
1961, however, put a stop to the latter. As a result, West Germany reoriented its 
recruitment towards elsewhere. Bilateral agreements were signed with Turkey (1961), 
Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965), and Yugoslavia (1968). Other des-
tination countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, France, and Switzerland fol-
lowed, also signing labour migration agreements with these countries in the 1960s. 
 In this period, international migration was generally viewed positively because 
of its economic benefi ts (Bonifazi  2008 ), from the perspective of both the sending 
and the receiving countries. In the Mediterranean region, for example, emigration 
helped to alleviate pressures on the labour market, as the region was characterized 
by signifi cant demographic pressure, low productivity and incomes, and high unem-
ployment (Page Moch  2003 ; Vilar  2001 ). A comparison of annual gross national 
product per capita in the 1960s illustrates this with US $353 for Turkey, $822 for 
Spain, and $1272 for Italy; $1977 for the UK and $2324 for France (Page Moch 
 2003 , 180). Furthermore, migrants’ remittances were expected to benefi t the 
national economy. In Turkey, for example, the monetary returns of migrants became 
a vital element of the economy: the country even experienced economic destabiliza-
tion when labour migration to Germany ended in 1974 (Barou  2006 ). However, 
reasons for origin countries to support emigration went beyond the economic. The 
Italian government, for example, considered the labour migration programmes of 
North-Western European countries as a way to ‘get rid of the unemployed and to 
deprive the socialist and communist parties of potential voters’ (Hoerder  2002 , 
520). 
 Estimates of the numbers of individuals that left Italy, Spain, Greece, and 
Portugal between 1950 and 1970 vary from 7 to 10 million (Okólski  2012 ). As can 
be seen from Table  3.1 , in 1950 immigrant populations were most numerous in 
France, the UK, Germany, and Belgium.
 Twenty years later, at the beginning of the 1970s, these numbers had increased 
substantially in both absolute and relative terms (Table  3.1 ). One in seven manual 
labourers in the UK and one in four industrial workers in Belgium, France, and 
Switzerland were of foreign origin in the mid-1970s (Page Moch  2003 , not in table). 
Eighty per cent of the total foreign stock in 1975 was concentrated in four countries, 
namely France, Germany, Switzerland, and the UK (Bonifazi  2008 ). 
 At the same time, the process of decolonization gave rise to considerable migra-
tion fl ows towards Europe’s (former) colonial powers. A signifi cant number of 
people from the colonies came to Belgium, France, the Netherlands, the UK, and in 
the 1970s, Portugal. Many of these (return) migrants were juridically considered 
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citizens; estimates suggest that between 1940 and 1975 the number of people of 
European origin returning from the colonies was around 7 million (Bade  2003 ). The 
main (return) migration fl ows were from Kenya, India, and Malaysia to the UK, 
from Northern Africa to France and Italy, from Congo to Belgium (although in 
smaller numbers), and from Indonesia to the Netherlands (Bade  2003 ). Some of 
these migrants, as for example from the new Commonwealth, came for economic 
reasons (Page Moch  2003 ). Others, such as the Algerian  harkis (auxiliaries in the 
French colonial army) in France, Asian Ugandans in Britain, and a substantial share 
of Surinamese in the Netherlands, arrived during or after independence (ibid.). In 
the 1970s, Portugal received a signifi cant number of citizens “returning” from its 
former colonies, fl eeing from violent combats in the struggle for independence. 
Although European migrants returning from the colonies were often quickly able to 
insert themselves into the social fabric of the mother country, this was less the case 
for those of non-European origin who were economically and socially deprived and 
also often discriminated (Bade  2003 ). 
 Lastly, the Iron Curtain severely limited East-West mobility. Nevertheless, it did 
not bring East-West migration to a complete halt (Fassmann and Münz  1994 ). 
Straddling our period demarcations we discuss these migrations patterns here, as 
they started in this period. Between 1950 and 1990, 12 million people migrated 
from East to West (Fassmann and Münz  1992 ), many of them to Germany. Between 
1950 and 2004, for example, 4.45 million  Aussiedler— ethnic Germans from Central 
and Eastern Europe—returned to Germany (Dietz  2006 ). Until 1988, most of these 
 Aussiedler migrated from Poland (Dietz  2006 ; Münz and Ulrich  1998 ). Nevertheless, 
the largest share of these  Aussiedler (63 %) arrived after 1989 (Dietz  2006 ). The 
vast majority who came after the fall of the Iron Curtain originated from the former 
Soviet Union (Dietz  2006 ; Münz and Ulrich  1998 ). Occasionally, however, there 
were larger infl ows of Eastern Europeans, following political crises such as from 
Hungary (1956–1957), Czechoslovakia (1968–1969), and Poland (1980–1981) 
 Table 3.1  Minority populations in the main Western-European countries of immigration, 1950–
1975 (thousands and last column % of total population) 
 Country  1950  1960  1970  1975 
 As per cent of total 
population 1975 
 Belgium  354  444  716  835  8.5 
 France  2128  2663  3339  4196  7.9 
 West Germany  548  686  2977  4090  6.6 
 Netherlands  77  101  236  370  2.6 
 Sweden  124  191  411  410  5.0 
 Switzerland  279  585  983  1012  16.0 
 United Kingdom  1573  2205  3968  4153  7.8 
 Source : Castles et al. ( 2014 , 108). See Castles et al. ( 1984 , 87–88) for detailed sources 
 Notes: Figures for all countries except the UK are for foreign residents. They exclude naturalized 
persons and immigrants from the Dutch and French colonies. UK data are census fi gures for 1951, 
1961, and 1971 and estimates for 1975. The 1951 and 1961 data are for overseas-born persons and 
exclude children born to immigrants in the UK. The 1971 and 1975 fi gures include children born 
in the UK, with both parents born abroad 
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(Castles et al.  2014 ; Fassmann and Münz  1992 ,  1994 ). In line with the logic of the 
Cold War, whatever the motives of those who moved to the West, they were consid-
ered to be political refugees (Fassmann and Münz  1994 ). 
 From 1974 to the End of the 1980s: The Oil Crisis 
and Migration Control 
 The oil crisis of 1973–1974 had considerable impact on the economic landscape of 
Europe. The crisis gave impetus to economic restructuring, sharply reducing the 
need for labour (Boyle, Halfacree & Robinson 1998). During this period, belief in 
unbridled economic growth diminished. Switzerland and Sweden were the fi rst 
countries to invoke a migration stop, respectively, in 1970 and 1972. Others fol-
lowed: Germany in 1973 and the Benelux and France in 1974. Policies aiming to 
control and reduce migration, however, transformed rather than stopped migration. 
The number of foreign residents kept rising, due to a change in European migra-
tion systems from circular to chain migration and the related natural growth of 
migrant populations. Migrants from non-European countries who had come under 
labour recruitment schemes increasingly settled permanently, as returning to their 
home country for long periods now entailed a signifi cant risk of losing their resi-
dence permit. Many migrants started to bring their families to Europe. Although 
governments initially tried to limit family migration, this met little success (Castles 
et al.  2014 ; Hansen  2003 ). After all, family reunifi cation of migrant workers was 
considered a fundamental right, anchored in article 19 of the European Social 
Charter of 1961. 
 The composition of the residing migrant population also changed during this 
period. Whereas in the fi rst period, European migrants were most numerous, the 
share of non-European migrant populations signifi cantly grew during the second 
period. In Sweden, for example, 40 % of the foreign born were non-European by 
1999, compared to only 7.6 % in 1970 (Goldscheider et al.  2008 ). This refl ected the 
continuing immigration and natural growth of these populations. But it was also the 
result of a larger extent of return migration among Southern European populations, 
given the increased quality of life and employment opportunities in Southern Europe 
(Barou  2006 ). In countries on the other side of the Mediterranean, population pres-
sure continued to be substantial, due to high fertility and unemployment rates. 
During this period, the number of Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, and 
Yugoslavian foreigners in Europe diminished (except in Switzerland, where the 
number of Portuguese and Yugoslavians grew), and a signifi cant increase was 
observed in the number of Turks and North Africans across Europe (Bade  2003 ). 
 After the migration stop, countries increasingly controlled entries of foreigners, 
and migration became an important topic in national political and public debates 
(Bonifazi  2008 ; see also Doomernik & Bruquetas in this volume). Increasing unem-
ployment levels due to the economic recession fuelled hostility, racism, and xenopho-
bia towards certain “visible” groups of resident migrants. In several European 
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countries, violent anti-foreigners incidents occurred. In France, for example, Le Pen’s 
 Front National acquired considerable political support for its simple message that ‘2 
million unemployed = 2 million immigrants too many’ (Boyle et al.  1998 , 27). During 
this period, however, awareness also grew that immigrant populations were here to 
stay. As a result, the need for adequate integration policies became apparent, and such 
policies slowly started to develop (see Doomernik and Bruquetas in this volume). 
 In this same phase, numbers of asylum applications started to rise in Europe 
(especially in the 1980s and after the fall of the Berlin Wall; Hansen  2003 ). Between 
the early 1970s and the end of the twentieth century the number of asylum applica-
tions in the EU, at that time 15 member states, increased from 15,000 to 300,000 
annually (Hatton  2004 ). Germany was the largest recipient of asylum applications 
in Europe in all periods (Table  3.2 ). From the 1980s onwards, signifi cant increases 
were also observed in Belgium, the Netherlands, and the UK. The different attrac-
tiveness of particular European countries over time is related to historical events 
that have induced new refugee fl ows. The dramatic increase in asylum applications 
from within Europe in the early 1990s, for example, accompanied the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union and the Yugoslavian wars (Hatton  2004 , see also further on in 
this chapter).
 The restrictions on the entrance of foreigners into North-Western Europe also 
had another effect. From the mid-1980s onwards, migration fl ows increasingly 
diverted towards Southern Europe, especially gaining momentum in the 1990s. 
 Table 3.2  Asylum applications to the EU-15 by destination country, 1970–1999 (thousands) 
 Years 
 1970–74  1975–79  1980–84  1985–89  1990–94  1995–99 
 Total EU applications  64.5  213.7  540.2  1012.3  2419.8  1613.5 
 Austria  8.7  14.7  63.2  64.4  76.1  53.5 
 Belgium  1.7  6.6  14.5  32.1  87.0  93.4 
 Denmark  3.7  1.3  5.6  42.1  76.4  36.0 
 Finland  –  –  0.1  0.3  11.4  6.9 
 France  5.1  40.5  106.3  178.7  184.5  112.2 
 Germany  34.3  121.8  249.6  455.3  1374.7  749.6 
 Greece  9.2  6.4  24.0  12.8  11.8 
 Ireland  –  –  –  –  0.5  21.2 
 Italy  11.0  9.2  16.5  26.3  40.8  48.8 
 Luxembourg  –  –  –  –  0.1  5.7 
 Netherlands  –  5.3  8.8  46.4  151.1  170.4 
 Portugal  0  1.7  4.3  1.3  3.9  1.7 
 Spain  –  –  5.4  15.7  53.1  30.4 
 Sweden  –  –  41.9  97.1  197.0  48.5 
 United Kingdom  –  3.4  17.5  28.5  150.8  223.3 
 Source : Hatton ( 2004 , 10). The numbers in Hatton ( 2004 ) are based on UNCHR ( 2001 , Tables I.2, 
II.2, III.2, IV.2, VI.4, and VI.5) 
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Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain had long been emigration countries. As a result, 
they did not dispose of well-developed immigration legislation and entrance control 
systems. Furthermore, these countries were experiencing economic growth and fall-
ing birth rates, resulting in labour shortages (Castles et al.  2014 ). The jobs available 
were often irregular ones, characterized by unfavourable labour conditions and low 
pay, making them unattractive to the local population. Southern Europe thus became 
an attractive destination for non-European migrants, especially those from North 
Africa, Latin America, Asia, and—after the fall of the Iron Curtain—Eastern Europe 
(Castles et al.  2014 ). 
 Besides migration fl ows from non-European countries, the favourable economic 
conditions in Southern Europe also resulted in return migration among those who 
had moved to Northern Europe. Spain, for example, registered the return of 451,000 
citizens during this period, of which 94 % had resided in another EU country (Barou 
 2006 ). Portugal, in contrast, experienced return migration from its former colonies, 
where fi erce and violent struggles for independence were under way. Greece was 
the last country to transition from an emigration into an immigration country. Until 
1973, some 1 million Greeks were working abroad (Bade  2003 ). Half of them 
returned in the period after the oil crisis (ibid.). 
 From the 1990s to 2012: Recent Trends in Migration 
towards and Within Europe 
 Patterns of migration from, towards, and within Europe underwent signifi cant 
changes and further diversifi cation starting in 1990. The collapse of the Iron Curtain 
and the opening of the borders of Eastern Europe induced new migration fl ows 
across Europe. The end of the Cold War, as well as the wars in the former Yugoslavia 
led to new fl ows of asylum seekers to Western Europe. Between 1989 and 1992, for 
example, asylum applications increased from 320,000 to 695,000, to decline to 
455,000 by the end of the decade (Hansen  2003 ) and increase again to 471,000 in 
2001 (Castles et al.  2014 ). The top-fi ve countries of origin during this period were 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (836,000), Romania (400,000), Turkey 
(356,000), Iraq (211,000), and Afghanistan (155,000) (ibid.). In the fi rst decade of 
the twenty-fi rst century, new asylum applications followed the conjuncture of 
admission restrictions and numbers of violent confl icts (ibid.). Between 2002 and 
2006, asylum applications in the EU-15 decreased from 393,000 to 180,000 (ibid.). 
From 2006 onwards, however, asylum applications rose due to the confl icts in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and more recently, the Arab Spring. By 2010, the EU-25 plus 
Norway and Switzerland had received 254,180 applications, and humanitarian 
migration accounted for 6 % of newcomers to the EU (ibid.). Most applications 
were made in France (47,800), Germany (41,300), Sweden (31,800), the UK 
(22,100), and Belgium (19,900) (OECD  2011 , Table A.1.3., cited in Castles et al. 
 2014 , 229). 
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 The 1992 Maastricht Treaty’s abolition of borders considerably eased intra-EU 
movements (see also next sections of this chapter). At the same time, entrance into 
the EU became progressively restricted due to the unifi cation of the European mar-
ket, which imposed strict border controls and visa regulations. These controls on the 
entrance of foreigners went hand in hand with increased irregular migration (Bade 
 2003 ; Bonifazi  2008 ; Castles et al.  2014 ). Migrants’ countries of origin as well as 
their migration motives became increasingly diversifi ed.
 [Nowadays migrants] come to Europe from all over the world in signifi cant numbers: expa-
triates working for multinational companies and international organizations, skilled work-
ers from all over the world, nurses and doctors from the Philippines, refugees and asylum 
seekers from African, near Eastern and Asian countries, from the Balkan and former Soviet 
Union countries, students from China, undocumented workers from African countries, just 
to single out some of the major immigrant categories (Penninx  2006 , 8). 
 During this third period, integration issues became a central policy concern (see 
Doomernik & Bruquetas in this volume). Many European countries stepped up 
attempts to attract highly skilled or educated migrants. This goal is still refl ected 
in a number of national programmes today, for example, in Denmark, Germany, 
Sweden, and the UK. The EU established its Blue Card Scheme, an EU-wide resi-
dence and work permit (Eurostat  2011 ). Moreover, student migration from outside 
the EU became increasingly important in some parts of the EU (ibid.). Some coun-
tries’ governments have actively recruited students with the intention of incorpo-
rating the “best and brightest” into their domestic labour market upon graduation 
(Lange  2013 ). Institutions of higher education have joined these efforts, stimu-
lated by the economic benefi ts of attracting international students in the form of 
high tuition fees (Findlay  2011 ). In this context, several European countries, such 
as France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK simplifi ed procedures for inter-
national students to make the education-to-work transition (Tremblay  2005 ; Van 
Mol  2014 ). 
 In the last section of this chapter, we differentiate between intra-EU mobility of 
European citizens and migration within and towards the EU of third-country nation-
als, as these groups are subject to different legislation. Intra-European mobility is 
often considered in positive terms, as contributing to the EU’s ‘vitality and competi-
tiveness’ (e.g., EC  2011 , 3–4). European citizens, moreover, are entitled to move 
freely within the EU without the need for a visa, and hence may face fewer institu-
tional barriers in migration trajectories. Migration into the EU, in contrast, remains 
largely associated with active measures of access restriction and border control 
(see, e.g., Council of the EU  2002 ). In recent decades, European migration policy 
has thus represented ‘different intersecting regimes of mobility that normalise the 
movements of some travellers while criminalising and entrapping the ventures of 
others’ (Glick Schiller and Salazar  2013 , 189). The global economic crisis that 
started in 2008 might be considered the end of this third period, as it brought, at 
least temporarily, an end to ‘rapid economic growth, EU expansion and high immi-
gration’ (Castles et al.  2014 , 103). However, as Castles, De Haas and Miller (ibid.) 
observe, the decline in immigration from non-European countries has been rather 
modest, and the anticipated mass returns to migrants’ home countries have not 
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occurred as yet. The crisis mainly seems to have affected intra-European migration, 
with a decrease in overall free movement within the EU and with the peripheral 
countries hardest hit by the crisis—particularly Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and 
Spain—again becoming emigration countries (Castles et al.  2014 ). 
 Migration Towards and from Europe 
 We fi rst analyse general trends in migration towards Europe, based on new esti-
mates of global migration fl ows by Abel and Sander ( 2014 ). Their fi gures are based 
on stock statistics published by the United Nations. Note, however, that using stock 
data might be misleading for measuring fl ows. Furthermore, although the tables 
below represent the best estimates available, they are far from complete, as they are 
based on national statistics and thus refl ect different legislation and defi nitions. This 
causes, for example, diffi culties in comparability between countries as well as over 
time. The presented fi gures should thus be seen as indicative of larger patterns. The 
circular plots present migration fl ows from different world regions towards Europe 
and vice versa (Fig.  3.1 ) for four fi ve-year periods between 1990 and 2010. Broader 
lines indicate more sizeable migration fl ows, while the arrow indicates the direction 
of the fl ow. As can be observed, migration from former Soviet Union countries to 
Europe gained momentum after the fall of the Berlin Wall but gradually decreased 
thereafter. Migration from Africa to Europe increased, especially in the mid-1990s. 
Furthermore, migration from East, South, and South-East Asia and from Latin 
America signifi cantly rose, particularly after the start of the twenty-fi rst century. 
Finally, migration from North America, Oceania, and West Asia remained relatively 
stable. Additional Eurostat data (not in the plots) show that between 2009 and 2012, 
the infl ux of non-EU migrants into the EU decreased slightly, from 1.4 million in 
2009 to 1.2 million in 2012 (Eurostat  2014a ).
 In terms of the stock, 4 % of the total EU population in 2013 was a non-EU 
national, accounting for about 6 % of the EU’s total working age population (Eurostat 
 2014a ). Non-EU nationals were evenly split between men and women (ibid.). Note, 
however, that these data by nationality do not include all foreign- origin European 
residents (meaning those born abroad or having a foreign-born parent), as they cover 
only those who did not hold the nationality of the country they resided in. We further 
deconstruct these general trends below with a main focus on the last decade. 
 Looking at the top-15 countries of origin of newly arrived immigrants in 2009 
and 2012, we fi nd large numbers of migrants from India and China, followed by 
Morocco and Pakistan (Table  3.3 ). Based on fi gures from 2008, the majority of 
Indian and Pakistani migrants seems to have headed to the UK. Most Chinese 
migrants seem to have gone to Spain (Eurostat  2011 ), and Moroccan migrants were 
mainly attracted to Italy and Spain.
 In addition to the data on newly arriving immigrants (fl ow statistics), it is also 
relevant to know the main countries of origin of non-European migrants residing in 
the EU (stock statistics). When considering the top-10 countries of origin of  non- EU 
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nationals residing in the EU (Table  3.4 ), it can be noted that the largest residing 
populations are from countries where Europe recruited labour in the post-war period 
(Morocco and Turkey), as well as from former colonies (India and Pakistan), and 
countries near the EU’s eastern border (Albania, Russia, and Serbia). The large 
Chinese diaspora is also prominent as well as the—mostly highly-skilled and life-
style (Castles et al.  2014 )—migrants from the USA.
 Until the 1990s, the vast majority of migrants could conveniently be classifi ed 
under the categories “family reunifi cation”, “labour migration”, and “asylum”. 
Since the 1990s, however, migration motives have become increasingly diversifi ed, 
including a growing number of young people migrating to attend higher education. 
According to Eurostat ( 2014a ), in 2012, 32 % of migrants received a residence per-
 Fig. 3.1  Circular plots of migration fl ows towards and from Europe, per 5 year period between 
1990 and 2010 ( Source :  www.global-migration.info ) 
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 Table 3.3  Top-15 countries of origin of newly arrived non-EU migrants in the EU, 2009 and 2012 
 2009  2012 
 Country of origin 
 Number of 
migrants  Country of origin 
 Number of 
migrants 
 1.  India  92,575  China (incl. Hong Kong)  87,889 
 2.  Morocco  78,729  India  64,416 
 3.  China (incl. Hong Kong)  65,367  Morocco  53,121 
 4.  Ukraine  47,747  Pakistan  43,108 
 5.  Pakistan  35,969  United States  38,587 
 6.  United States  32,072  Russia  28,807 
 7.  Philippines  29,800  Ukraine  26,068 
 8.  Albania  28,153  Nigeria  21,130 
 9.  Bangladesh  25,611  Australia  19,331 
 10.  Peru  24,740  Brazil  18,307 
 11.  Moldova  24,222  Albania  16,775 
 12.  Brazil  24,204  Philippines  16,748 
 13.  Colombia  23,274  Turkey  16,198 
 14.  Nigeria  21,657  Bangladesh  13,880 
 15.  Russia  21,057  Afghanistan  13,060 
 Source : Eurostat ( 2014a ) 
 Note: Numbers refer to non-EU nationals whose previous place of residence was in a non-EU 
country and who had established their residence in a EU member state in the respective year 
 Table 3.4  Top-10 countries 
of nationality of non-EU 
migrants residing in the 
European Union, 2012 
 Country of origin  Number of migrants 
 1.  Turkey  1,983,240 
 2.  Morocco  1,384,935 
 3.  China (incl. Hong Kong)  724,428 
 4.  India  650,710 
 5.  Ukraine  634,851 
 6.  Russia  589,634 
 7.  Albania  464,149 
 8.  Serbia  408,491 
 9.  Pakistan  407,133 
 10.  United States  406,266 
 Source : Eurostat ( 2014a ) 
 Note: Numbers refer to non-EU nationals whose previous 
place of residence was in a non-EU country and who had 
established their residence in a EU member state for a period 
of at least 12 months 
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mit for family reasons, 23 % for work, 22 % for education, and 23 % for other rea-
sons including asylum. Moreover, it should be noted that these categories report 
only the main migration motive as captured in the offi cial statistics. In practice, 
these categories refl ect migration motives as accepted in admission labels. Both 
may shift in the course of time. International students, for example, might become 
labour migrants upon graduation, and subsequently seek family reunifi cation. 
 Lastly, migration is often not limited to moving from Country A to Country B but 
may involve several successive destinations. Considering intra-EU mobility of 
third-country nationals, an upward trend is observed between 2007 and 2011. This 
trend is most prominent in Germany, where the number of third-country nationals 
arriving from European Economic Area countries more than tripled, from 3784 in 
2007 to 11,532 in 2011 (EMN  2013 ). A similar rise is also observed in the UK, 
where numbers increased from 1000 to 3000 (ibid.). Increases seem to be more 
modest in other EU countries, such as Austria (33.6 %), Finland (17.1 %), the 
Netherlands (53.7 %), and Sweden (30.2 %) (ibid.). However, whereas these per-
centages are high, absolute numbers are generally low. Compared with European 
citizens, intra-EU moves of third-country nationals are found to form only a small 
share of total intra-EU mobility between 2007 and 2011. The share of non-EU 
nationals in these movements barely surpasses 4 % in the countries for which statis-
tics are available: 1.8 % in Germany, 3.6 % in Austria, 3.7 % in Finland, 2.3 % in 
the Netherlands, and 1.2 % in the UK (ibid.). Third-country nationals, moreover, 
move to geographically close countries, for example, from Germany and Italy to 
Austria, from Estonia and Sweden to Finland, from the Czech Republic and 
Germany to Poland, from Austria and the Czech Republic to Slovakia, and from 
Denmark and Germany to Sweden (ibid.). In sum, although it is often assumed that 
linear migration trajectories between two countries are less common now (see, e.g., 
Pieke et al.  2004 ), non-EU migrants do not seem to move frequently within the 
EU. This might be due to the legal restrictions often imposed on this group of 
migrants, or it could be more related to factors such as language similarities between 
bordering countries (De Valk and Díez Medrano  2014 ). 
 Mobility of EU Citizens 
 Numbers and Destinations 
 Previous studies indicate that only a small share of the European population is 
mobile (Bonin et al.  2008 ; Pascouau  2013 ). Favell and Recchi ( 2009 ), for example, 
show that less than one in fi fty Europeans lives abroad, and around 4 % have some 
experience of living and working abroad. Nevertheless, the scale of intra-EU mobil-
ity clearly increased between 2000 and 2011 (Fig.  3.2 ). Data from Eurostat ( 2011 ), 
for example, show that nearly 2 million EU citizens moved within the EU in 2008. 
In absolute numbers, Polish migration made up the greatest share of intra-EU fl ows 
in the fi rst decade of the twenty-fi rst century (Fig.  3.2 ). Migration between Poland 
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 Fig. 3.2  Top-ten intra-European migration fl ows, 2000–2011 (absolute numbers) 












i = according to country of immigration; e = according to country of emigration; 
DE: Immigration 2000–2003 = 2000, 2002, and 2003; 
FR: Immigration and emigration 2000–2003 = 2002–2003; 
IT: Immigration and emigration 2000–2003 = 2001–2003; 
ES: Emigration 2000–2003 = 2002–2003 
Data source: Eurostat, own calculations by NIDI
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i= according to country of immigration; e=according to country of emigration
UK: Immigration 200–42007=2004–2006
Data source: Eurostat
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DE: Immigration and emigration 2008–2011=2008
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and Germany was most prevalent, and consists of movements from as well as to 
Poland. The prevalence of Polish-German migration might be explained by the fact 
that such migration has been regulated since 1990, when the German and Polish 
governments signed a bilateral agreement allowing Polish citizens to engage in 
legal seasonal employment for 3 months in specifi c sectors of the German economy 
(Dietz and Kaczmarczyk  2008 ). This led to a sharp increase in the infl ow of Polish 
seasonal workers in Germany, from approximately 78,600 in 1992 to 280,000 in 
2002 (ibid.). From 2004 to 2007, after Poland’s EU accession, we observe a similar 
increase in population movements from Poland to the UK. This can be attributed to 
the fact that—unlike other EU member states—Ireland, Sweden, and the UK did not 
restrict migration from the new member states. Of these three destinations, Ireland 
and the UK were the most popular, in part due to favourable labour market condi-
tions (Castles et al.  2014 ). In more recent years, however, many Polish migrants 
have left the UK, indicating increasing return migration, perhaps related to the eco-
nomic crisis, as the Polish economy has kept growing (Castles et al.  2014 ). Apart 
from the migration fl ows from and towards Poland, similar infl ows and outwards 
movements from Romania were observed between 2000 and 2011. Whereas 
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between 2000 and 2003 some 39,000 Romanians migrated to Italy and Spain, these 
numbers increased to about 110,000 in the subsequent years. Furthermore, 
Romanian migration to Italy remained relatively stable, in sharp contrast with the 
migration fl ow towards Spain, which dropped sharply between 2008 and 2011. This 
can be attributed to the more diffi cult labour market conditions in Spain, because of 
the economic crisis, which has redirected the movement of Romanian migrants 
towards other EU countries (OECD  2013 ).
 Besides migration between Eastern Europe and several other EU countries, 
migration fl ows have been considerable between the UK, France, and Spain. These 
movements likely include retirement migration from Northern to Southern Europe, 
but also point to increased labour mobility between these countries, especially con-
sidering the fl ows towards the UK, as will be further discussed later. 
 Finally, in recent years, the global economic crisis seems to have impacted pat-
terns of intra-EU migration. Data from the OECD ( 2013 ) show, for example, an 
increase in emigration from countries heavily affected by the crisis (Table  3.5 ). Cases 
in point are Greece and Spain where unemployment rose to unprecedented lev-
els—27.3 % in Greece and 26.1 % in Spain in 2013, with youth unemployment rates 
of, respectively, 58.3 and 55.5 % that same year (Eurostat  2014b ). Countries that 
eased their way into economic recovery, such as Iceland and Ireland, have already 
registered declines in the numbers of individuals leaving these countries (OECD 
 2013 ). Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK appear to be popular desti-
nation countries, as intra-European migration fl ows towards these countries almost 
doubled in the 5 years prior to 2012. The crisis, however, also led to migration to 
 Table 3.5  Migration from specifi c European countries to main European and other OECD 
destination countries, 2007–2011 
 Index  Number (thousands) 
 2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2011 
 Country of origin 
 Greece  100  106  102  143  236  39 
 Iceland  100  111  163  165  135  4 
 Ireland  100  104  174  210  181  21 
 Italy  100  116  111  132  142  85 
 Portugal  100  120  98  103  125  55 
 Spain  100  114  123  173  224  72 
 Country of destination 
 Germany  100  105  116  133  188  78 
 United Kingdom  100  120  113  174  195  88 
 Switzerland  100  116  96  102  121  33 
 Belgium  100  142  146  169  193  15 
 Netherlands  100  138  144  157  184  12 
 All other OECD countries  100  109  116  124  129  50 
 Total  100  115  114  140  165  275 
 Source : OECD ( 2013 , 23) 
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non-European countries, such as Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, Turkey, the 
USA, and in the case of Portugal, to former colonies in Africa (Castles et al.  2014 ).
 It is important to keep in mind that most of the previous analyses are based on 
absolute numbers, whereby EU member states with larger populations are logically 
more visible. We now consider the relative importance of migration fl ows as a share 
of countries’ total immigration and emigration fi gures. Figure  3.3 shows the relative 
share of EU migration for selected EU countries.
 Intra-EU migration forms a substantial share of movements to and from the 
majority of the countries in Fig.  3.3 . Based on these numbers, we can discern sev-
eral groups. The fi rst group consists of countries where intra-EU immigration and 
emigration comprises the largest share of migration movements. It includes Austria, 
Germany, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, and Denmark. 
The attraction of these countries is explained by their well-developed economies. 
Particularly signifi cant within this group are Polish and Lithuanian migrants mov-
ing on to other European destinations. The second group is made up of countries 
where more than half of emigration moves are directed towards other European 
countries, and immigration is mostly non-European. This group is comprised of 
Finland, Italy, Latvia, and Romania. Their geographical location at the borders of 
Europe might explain this pattern, as these countries receive immigrants from 
neighbouring (non-European) countries and function as transit countries. 

















PL: immigration 2008–2011 = 2008 and 2010; emigration 2008–2011 = 2008; 
RO: emigration 2008–2011 = 2008
(Source: Eurostat, own calculations by NIDI)
 Fig. 3.3  Share of intra-European migrants in total emigration and immigration for selected 
European countries, 2008–2011 (%) 
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Furthermore, these countries might be less attractive to migrants from other EU 
countries because of their limited economic opportunities and relatively low wages 
(except for Finland). The third group consists of countries where both emigration 
and immigration from and to non-European countries is still of considerable impor-
tance. This group includes Spain, Sweden, and the UK. For Sweden, the most popu-
lar destinations for migrants are (besides the Nordic neighbours) English-speaking 
countries such as the UK and the USA (Mannheimer  2012 ). In terms of the arriving 
population, humanitarian refuge and family reunifi cation are the main channels of 
immigration in Sweden, which explains the large share of non-European migrants 
(Fredlund-Blomst  2014 ). Spain’s and the UK’s migration balances might refl ect 
continuing migration from former colonies and historical links with various world 
regions which include, for example, language similarities. The UK attracts a consid-
erable number of migrants from ex-colonies such as India and Pakistan (Offi ce for 
National Statistics  2011 ). Furthermore, the principal non-European destinations for 
UK migrants are English-speaking countries such as Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, and the USA (Murray et al.  2012 ). For Spain, non-European migrants 
mainly originate from Morocco and Latin American countries, and Spanish migrants 
emigrate to Latin American countries such as Argentina and Venezuela (INE  2014 ). 
 Demographic Characteristics of Intra-EU Movers 
 It has been suggested that free movement within the EU is particularly availed of by 
the highly educated (Favell  2008 ). We therefore investigate the demographic char-
acteristics of those who move within Europe, focusing on selected cases and the 
period 2008–2011. Contrasting these cases, for which we have detailed information, 
suggests the diversity of migration fl ows and motives within Europe. Obviously this 
analysis does not do justice to more recent moves from Southern Europe to North- 
Western Europe, but data to make similar analyses are not yet at hand. 
 We start with characteristics of those who move. Figure  3.4 shows population 
pyramids for Polish migrants heading to Germany and vice versa. As we demon-
strated previously (see Fig.  3.2 ), Polish-German migration is the most prominent 
intra-European migration fl ow in absolute numbers. The population pyramids are 
indicative of the trend in the preceding years. Mobility between both countries is 
clearly dominated by men, particularly those between 20 and 50 years of age. This 
strongly male-dominated movement of Polish workers towards Germany appears 
temporary, as a similar population moves back again (compare Fig.  3.4a and b ).
 When we compare Polish migration to Germany with Polish migration to the 
Netherlands, we fi nd a different panorama (Fig.  3.5 ). Polish migrants in the 
Netherlands are signifi cantly younger, the majority being between 20 and 35 years 
of age. Moreover, there is a more equal gender balance. The coincidence of these 
migration fl ows with other life transitions, such as having children and forming a 
union, is crucial to gain insight into the way intra-European mobility develops over 
the life course.
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 Recent research on Polish migrants based on Dutch population registers shows 
that having children as well as the choice of partner are important determinants of 
permanent settlement (Kleinepier et al.  2015 ). Similar fi ndings have been reported 
on intra-EU migrant groups in other destinations such as Belgium and the UK (see, 
e.g., Levrau et al.  2014 ; Ryan and Mulholland  2013 ). Where generally circular and 
return migration of intra-EU movers is high, this seems especially so for those who 
are young, single, and do not have children (see, e.g., Bijwaard  2010 ; Braun and 
Arsene  2009 ; Kleinepier et al.  2015 ; Nekby  2006 ). 
 The relationship between life course and migration becomes more apparent when 
we compare migrants from Romania and those from the UK residing in Spain (Fig. 
 3.6 ). Romanian migration to Spain is clearly dominated by young people, with an 
overrepresentation of the 20–24 year category. Most of these men and women arrived 
in Spain for work or study. The population pyramid of British residents in Spain has 
a totally different structure. Some of the British migrants are 30–40 years old, and 
many are in the older age groups, from 55 years and older. Thus, British migrants in 
Spain seem to be free movers coming to work in Spain alongside retirement migrants.
 Fig. 3.4  Population pyramid of migrants from Poland to Germany ( a ) and Germany to Poland ( b ), 
2008 (%) 
a




















Data source: Eurostat; calculations by NIDI
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 In sum, patterns of intra-EU migration are becoming increasingly diverse. 
European citizens enjoy the right of freedom of movement, and might decide to 
temporarily or permanently settle in another European country for a variety of rea-
sons, including family formation, retirement, study, and work. Finally it is crucial to 
realize that categorization of migrants into certain migration motives is rather dif-
fi cult as very often multiple different reasons overlap (see, e.g., Gilmartin and 
Migge  2015 ; Santacreu et al.  2009 ; Verwiebe  2014 ). 
 Conclusions 
 In this chapter we addressed the fi rst key actor of the binomials presented in Chap. 
 1 of this volume, namely migrants themselves. We fi rst of all presented a historical 
overview of trends in international migration to and within Europe since the 1950s. 
Furthermore, we examined the demographic characteristics of these migration fl ows 
b
Data source: Eurostat; calculations by NIDI
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as well as the characteristics of residing migrants across Europe using recent data. 
We looked at both immigration and emigration in the European context to do suffi -
cient justice to the dynamic nature of migration. Yet, our fi ndings provide only a 
general overview, as the complexity of migration to and from Europe extends well 
beyond the scope of a single chapter. Three historical periods were distinguished. It 
is important to bear these different periods in mind when studying current migration 
fl ows in Europe. They help to frame but also for analysing the (demographic) behav-
iour of migrant populations. The distinguished periods may help us to structure and 
understand the socio-demographic situations which migrants face today. In addi-
tion, this distinction into different periods enables us to appreciate the current and 
ongoing political and public debates on migration in Europe. 
 The fi rst period was characterized by labour migration and a favourable stance 
towards migration, covering the years from the beginning of the bilateral guest 
worker agreements until the oil crisis. European governments fi rst recruited guest 
workers in Southern Europe, but quickly expanded towards countries at Europe’s 
borders. Apart from labour migration, a signifi cant postcolonial migration fl ow char-
NB. NL 2009: break in series due to new regulation




















Data source: Eurostat; calculations by NIDI
 Fig. 3.5  Population pyramid of Polish migrants to the Netherlands, 2009 (%) 
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acterized this period. Due to struggles for independence in former colonies, many 
European countries received return migrants as well as migrants fl eeing hostile con-
fl ict environments. The Cold War limited East-West mobility during this period. 
 The second period extended from the oil crisis in the early 1970s to the fall of the 
Iron Curtain in the late 1980s. It was characterized by a cessation of guest worker 
migration and stringent entry restrictions for new migrants. Nevertheless, migration 
fl ows were transformed rather than halted. Whereas previously labour migration 
had been the main migration channel, family reunifi cation (and family formation) 
now took over the primary role, and asylum applications were also on the rise. 
European governments became aware that migrant populations were likely to 
remain on their territory, and they slowly began to develop integration policies. This 
continues to be an important issue in the discourse today. 
 The third period dates from the 1990s to the present day. During this time, we fi nd 
substantial diversifi cation in terms of countries of origin, destinations, fl ows, migra-
tion motives, and structure of migrant populations. One of the most important ele-
ments in this period has been the removal of barriers to intra-European mobility, 
while migration into the EU has become more restricted. As such, intra-EU mobility 
 Fig. 3.6  Population pyramid of Romanian ( a ) and British ( b ) migrants in Spain, 2008–2011 (%) 
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Data source: Eurostat; calculations by NIDI
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and migration into the EU have become embedded in different and often opposing 
discourses. The end of this third period might be the economic crisis, which so far 
seems to have affected mainly intra-European mobility patterns. Peripheral countries 
have been hit particularly hard by the crisis, and an increasing tendency towards 
emigration can be observed from countries such as Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, 
and Spain. Immigration of non-EU migrants, however, seems less affected. This is 
perhaps because many migrants from outside Europe have found other routes of 
arrival, including irregular entrance and stay. Moreover, European countries are inter-
ested in highly skilled migrants in the context of a global competition for talent. 
 As a result, it seems that comparable to the “migration stop” after the oil crisis of 
the 1970s or during the Cold War, migration towards Europe will be transformed 
rather than come to a complete halt in the coming years. Mobility within Europe, in 
this regard, cannot be seen as separate from migration from outside the EU. Studying 
migration systems rather than focusing exclusively on one aspect of mobility is thus 
called for. At the same time, our analyses in this chapter also suggest an increasing 
dichotomy between migrants who are in a favourable situation with easy access and 
rights in Europe (e.g., EU free movers and highly skilled migrants) and those in less 
b
Data source: Eurostat; calculations by NIDI
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favourable situations (mainly those arriving from outside Europe for other reasons). 
Development of this dichotomy has important consequences for the lives of 
 individual migrants and for social cohesion. European societies must demonstrate 
awareness of this with policies crafted to acknowledge the diverse nature and 
dynamic character of migration that we have shown in this chapter. 
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